31 July 2025 – Istanbul
INTRODUCTION: GEOPOLITICAL DICE AND THE ENERGY MATRIX IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
In geopolitics, there are moments when both dice roll a six. This symbolizes low-probability, high-impact events. Yet, in today’s global system, this “double six” is not merely a coincidence; it is a necessary fracture—emerging at the intersection of certain infrastructural thresholds, energy demand/supply curves, and the fragility of supply chains. It is akin to a rare yet golden alignment in which a country’s energy demand reaches its peak, while all import routes are simultaneously open, secure, economically viable, and unrestricted; strategic reserves are fully stocked; international LNG prices are low; and major rivals are distracted elsewhere.
The unfolding dynamics in Southeast Asia are not merely regional tensions—they are rapidly becoming central to strategic planning as one of the most dynamic fronts of global power competition. U.S. military deployment policies and China’s economic expansion strategies are colliding along the Thailand–Myanmar–Cambodia corridor, turning the region into a kind of geopolitical poker table.
The melancholic atmosphere of the film Indochine, starring Catherine Deneuve, reflects the collapse of a former empire and uncertainty about the future. Today, the rising tensions in Southeast Asia evoke a similar sense of geopolitical ambiguity. Yet this time, the issue is not a colonial legacy—it is the potential to become a new piece in the global chessboard of U.S.–China competition. In this context, the strategic island of Guam may be seen as more than a military base; it is the encrypted nerve center of expansive geopolitical calculations. Seen from Guam, Thailand’s relations with its neighbors are not merely regional—they are a link in the Indo-Pacific security chain.
This analysis evaluates the developments along the Thailand–Myanmar–Cambodia axis through a multidimensional strategic approach, focusing on energy security, supply chains, U.S.–China rivalry, and Turkey’s global influence. The aim is to outline how regional crises might trigger vulnerabilities across a broad geography stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the Andaman Sea—and how these developments could influence the balance between the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia. Through its soft power diplomacy and energy engineering vision—especially via TİKA—Turkey holds the potential to amplify its regional role.
I. STRATEGIC SCENARIO VALUATIONS FOR CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
States’ economic systems are not linear—they are dynamic systems that produce chain effects. Let us assume each state holds six strategic cards: energy demand intensity, energy supply diversification, the openness and security of logistic routes, the capacity of strategic reserves, the distraction level of rivals, and international price stability and quota-free markets. The simultaneous optimal condition of all six—assuming each is an “ace”—yields a classical probability of 1 in 46,656. This rarity applies equally to the scenario in which all six turn out negatively. Nevertheless, in geopolitical terms, such jackpot-like events are not impossible.
Should a state achieve this ideal scenario, it would breathe easier in energy diplomacy, reduce military expenditures, expand its diplomatic maneuverability, maintain an uninterrupted supply chain, accelerate its innovation pace, and enhance economic sustainability. But disruption in even one variable—for instance, global volatility in energy prices or port traffic slowdown due to a strike in Thailand—could fundamentally alter the entire energy equation.
China’s energy security remains structurally constrained by the so-called “Malacca Dilemma.” While efforts like the Kyaukpyu route, Central Asian pipelines, and Arctic LNG corridors attempt to diversify this dependency, ensuring these routes are simultaneously safe, economical, open, and pass through stable regimes is tantamount to rolling six aces at once. If China realizes this ideal, it would achieve flexibility in energy supply chains, optimal logistics costs, the capacity to focus military attention from the South China Sea toward Taiwan, and a competitive edge through low-cost industrial sourcing.
Conversely, tensions with Thailand’s neighbors could lead to supply delays at Thai ports, disrupting U.S. military logistics in the Philippines. Should China increase LNG imports via the Arctic, and Europe opt for Qatari over American LNG, the U.S. could suffer significant losses. Thus, major powers must simulate even seemingly unlikely scenarios. True intelligence lies not in calculating probabilities, but in foreseeing what appears improbable—by understanding its systemic underpinnings, timelines, and substitutes.
II. REGIONAL POWER DYNAMICS AND STRATEGIC FAULT LINES
Myanmar’s position along the Bay of Bengal makes it a crucial conduit for China’s energy security. Pipelines from Yunnan to Kyaukpyu were developed to reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca and are considered a bypass to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma.” The security of these pipelines is a priority not only for China but for all global actors seeking control over Indian Ocean maritime routes.
Myanmar’s internal conflicts threaten these infrastructures, posing a structural risk to China’s energy supply. However, this also increases regional and strategic interest from other energy-dependent states like India, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea. U.S. strategies to counter China’s investments emphasize infrastructure protection, promotion of alternate routes, and maritime traffic monitoring.
Cambodia, with limited offshore natural gas potential, has faced technical and financial setbacks. The Apsara field project by KrisEnergy began in 2020 but ceased in 2021 due to underperformance and financial constraints (Reuters, “KrisEnergy files for liquidation after failing to restructure,” 2021).
China’s Belt and Road investments in the Mekong Basin link Cambodia to Thailand and Myanmar, forming a high-density geostrategic triangle in energy, logistics, and security.
Thailand’s rising energy demand, industrial density, and transit position make it one of Southeast Asia’s key energy consumers. Strategic centers like Rayong Port, Map Ta Phut Industrial Zone, and Laem Chabang are not just economic—they are strategic targets. Any crisis in Myanmar could disrupt operations in these hubs, positioning Thailand as both a passive actor and a central balancing element for regional stability.
III. SECURITY OF MARITIME ROUTES AND ENERGY CORRIDORS
The Strait of Malacca—one of the critical arteries of global energy supply—mirrors, and in some parameters even exceeds, the strategic fragility and global dependency associated with the Strait of Hormuz. It remains the busiest trade and energy corridor linking Asia to Europe. However, its narrow, shallow, and congested structure has led to a growing interest in alternative routes. In this context, projects such as the Thai Land Bridge and the Kra Canal, both proposed in southern Thailand, carry the potential to reshape the region’s logistics and energy architecture.
Islands in southern Thailand, such as Phuket, with their deep-sea port capacities, direct access to the Andaman Sea, and seismically stable geological structures, are critical not only regionally but also globally. They play a vital role in Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) monitoring, undersea fiber optic cable protection, and naval power projection.
The frequent use of Phuket as a port of call by U.S. naval platforms—such as the USS Key West submarines and the USS Emory S. Land resupply vessels—underscores its strategic utility for maritime surveillance and logistical support.
The region’s undersea cable network is not only vital to internet infrastructure but also holds significance for cybersecurity, signals intelligence, and military communications. Beneath its tourist-facing image, Phuket and its surrounding geography may emerge as hotspots for intensified geopolitical competition in the near future due to these strategic infrastructures.
IV. THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND GUAM: PILLARS OF GLOBAL SECURITY
The Strait of Malacca and Guam are twin pillars of the United States’ strategy and power projection in the Indo-Pacific. While Malacca represents a strategic chokepoint that must be protected, Guam functions as the logistics and military fulcrum enabling the U.S. to secure that very presence. Together, they form the backbone of U.S. security and defense policy in the region.
With approximately 90,000 vessel passages annually, Malacca is a lifeline for global trade and energy flows. Guam, on the other hand, is the U.S.’s most advanced forward base in the Pacific, enabling real-time power projection. Given that over 80% of China’s energy and trade routes pass through the Strait of Malacca, the chokepoint presents a strategic vulnerability for Beijing—prompting efforts to identify alternative routes.
As is well known, the U.S. champions freedom of navigation in all maritime domains. The Strait of Malacca, therefore, serves not only as a gateway for supporting U.S. allies in the region but also as a strategic corridor for maintaining military presence. For China, however, any disruption to Malacca would inflict a major economic and energy shock—thus making it a pressure point in broader strategic calculations.
V. CHINA’S MYANMAR CARD: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MALACCA
In an attempt to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with the so-called “Malacca Dilemma”, China is positioning the Kyaukpyu Port and associated pipelines on Myanmar’s western coast as priority energy and logistics corridors. Similarly, Cambodian port investments play a central role in China’s ambitions for naval projection, trade route diversification, and regional influence.
China’s engagement with Myanmar and Cambodia is not solely about energy security; it also enhances naval maneuverability. The Kyaukpyu–Kunming pipelines, constructed in Myanmar, can transport around 22 million tons of crude oil and 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. This allows for direct transfer of hydrocarbons from the Middle East and Africa to China’s Yunnan Province, bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Malacca. This infrastructure, part of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), represents one of the few overland routes enabling China’s access to the Indian Ocean, diversifying its trade and energy inflows and thereby bolstering its global economic outreach.
In Cambodia, while offshore natural gas potential is limited, Chinese investments in port infrastructure are rapidly expanding. The modernization of the Ream Naval Base could extend the operational range of the Chinese navy across the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Satellite imagery and defense analyses indicate that the facility is increasingly accessible to the Chinese military. Both Myanmar and Cambodia are thus key nodes in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure diplomacy.
This strategy encompasses not only economic goals but also maritime control and deterrence objectives. In response, the U.S. and its allies are closely monitoring these developments, recalibrating their military basing strategies, naval surveillance, and regional alliances to counterbalance China’s expanding footprint.
VI. CHINA’S A2/AD STRATEGY: ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL
China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy aims to restrict U.S. and allied forces from operating freely in East Asian waters. The overarching goal is to neutralize the operational advantages provided by Guam and other U.S. forward bases. This doctrine is especially relevant in China’s “near seas”—the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait—and seeks to complicate foreign intervention during potential conflict scenarios.
The strategy targets both the First Island Chain (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo) and the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam. China’s growing military and economic presence in Myanmar and Cambodia grants it easier access to the Indian Ocean, thereby weakening U.S. influence over the Strait of Malacca. In countermeasure, the U.S. has adopted a strategy of dispersed presence, seeking allied ports and alternative logistical routes beyond Guam. This decentralized posture represents a highly intelligent adaptation to China’s A2/AD challenge. If Beijing succeeds in constraining U.S. force projection from Guam and other outposts, America’s regional influence would be severely diminished.
Accordingly, regional flashpoints such as the Thailand–Myanmar crisis should be interpreted not just as isolated tensions but as proxy manifestations of deeper strategic contests—including China’s A2/AD imperatives.
VII. MINERAL POLICIES, RARE EARTH ELEMENTS, AND THE TURKISH FACTOR
Myanmar’s northern regions account for approximately 10% of global rare earth element production—materials essential to strategic industries such as battery technology, chip manufacturing, electric vehicles, and solar panels. These resources are not only economically valuable but also hold considerable geopolitical significance. Given China’s reliance on these minerals for its technological supply chains, any internal unrest or external intervention in Myanmar could have severe consequences for global manufacturing and distribution systems.
Thailand, on the other hand, plays an increasingly prominent role in the Asia-Pacific mining competition, thanks to its high-value deposits of gold, tungsten, and lithium. Potential subsea mineral fields along its Andaman coastline could open up new geo-economic frontiers in the near future. In Cambodia, Chinese investments in phosphate and mineral reserves demonstrate that strategic non-energy raw materials are also part of the broader geopolitical tug-of-war.
VIII. THE U.S. RIMLAND DOCTRINE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND MIGRATION
The United States considers Southeast Asia a pivotal “rimland” region in its effort to contain China. Strategic enhancements to military installations in Thailand—such as the proposed $200 million investment in upgrading the U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield—reflect this containment strategy. In tandem, Washington’s diplomatic initiatives leverage the instability in Myanmar and Cambodia to expand its toolkit via Thailand.
Concurrently, climate change is exacerbating regional resource scarcity and jeopardizing water and food security, thereby fueling increased migration from Myanmar and Cambodia to Thailand (estimated between 1 to 2 million individuals). The construction of dams along the Mekong River—especially the 11 major ones controlled by China—has a direct impact on downstream nations’ water security, heightening regional hydro-political tensions. Islands around Phuket are becoming increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
Behind the façade of a vibrant tourism industry lies a demographic reality shaped by irregular migration from Myanmar and Cambodia. Field observations suggest a significant number of unregistered individuals engage in informal economic activities while evading local law enforcement. This unregulated population flow poses new-generation security threats for Thailand, including resource strain, housing crises, human rights violations, and the expansion of organized crime networks—vulnerabilities capable of undermining national stability.
For the United States, Thailand’s tensions with Cambodia and Myanmar are not merely humanitarian or democratic concerns, but serve a strategic purpose in the broader goal of encircling China. This alignment underscores that Guam’s strategic sphere extends as far west as the Mekong basin, reaffirming the crisis’s global dimensions. Due to their geographic positions—particularly those in the Andaman Sea—Thailand’s islands could function as forward outposts for intelligence collection and maritime security operations within the U.S. rimland strategy.
CONCLUSION: THE TECTONIC SHIFTS OF THE INDO-PACIFIC AND TURKEY’S ROLE
Echoing Henry Kissinger’s principle to “notice what is not immediately visible,” every development surrounding Thailand triggers new moves on the global chessboard. The tectonic shifts across Southeast Asia present Turkey with both an expanded sphere of influence and a unique opportunity to offer engineered solutions to global challenges.
The ongoing developments along the Thailand–Myanmar–Cambodia axis generate not only regional but global implications for energy security, supply chain continuity, and the control of strategic resources. The U.S.–China rivalry compels each actor in the region to redefine their strategic positioning, creating new maneuvering space for versatile diplomatic players such as Turkey.
A signal of unrest originating in Phuket could activate radar systems in Guam; internal conflict in Myanmar might disrupt petrochemical production in Thailand; and any narrowing of the Strait of Malacca could raise energy prices in Europe, setting off a domino effect.
Amid such risks, Turkey emerges as a neutral yet strategic actor under the visionary leadership of Foreign Minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan, bolstered by TİKA’s effective soft power outreach. Through its active participation in humanitarian diplomacy, development cooperation, and multilateral platforms (UN, ASEAN, G20), Ankara is positioned as a viable mediator in South Asian conflicts. Leveraging its expertise in energy engineering and mining, Turkey can contribute to regional resource governance, while its intelligence and security capabilities could help curb illicit activity.
This integrated approach not only elevates Turkey’s regional role but also strengthens its standing on the global geopolitical stage—poised as a strategic balancer between East and West.