INTRODUCTION: GEOPOLITICAL DICE AND THE ENERGY MATRIX IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In geopolitics, there are moments when both dice roll a six. This symbolizes low-probability, high-impact events. Yet, in today’s global system, this “double six” is not merely a coincidence; it is a necessary fracture—emerging at the intersection of certain infrastructural thresholds, energy demand/supply curves, and the fragility of supply chains. It is akin to a rare yet golden alignment in which a country’s energy demand reaches its peak, while all import routes are simultaneously open, secure, economically viable, and unrestricted; strategic reserves are fully stocked; international LNG prices are low; and major rivals are distracted elsewhere.

The unfolding dynamics in Southeast Asia are not merely regional tensions—they are rapidly becoming central to strategic planning as one of the most dynamic fronts of global power competition. U.S. military deployment policies and China’s economic expansion strategies are colliding along the Thailand–Myanmar–Cambodia corridor, turning the region into a kind of geopolitical poker table.

The melancholic atmosphere of the film Indochine, starring Catherine Deneuve, reflects the collapse of a former empire and uncertainty about the future. Today, the rising tensions in Southeast Asia evoke a similar sense of geopolitical ambiguity. Yet this time, the issue is not a colonial legacy—it is the potential to become a new piece in the global chessboard of U.S.–China competition. In this context, the strategic island of Guam may be seen as more than a military base; it is the encrypted nerve center of expansive geopolitical calculations. Seen from Guam, Thailand’s relations with its neighbors are not merely regional—they are a link in the Indo-Pacific security chain.

This analysis evaluates the developments along the Thailand–Myanmar–Cambodia axis through a multidimensional strategic approach, focusing on energy security, supply chains, U.S.–China rivalry, and Turkey’s global influence. The aim is to outline how regional crises might trigger vulnerabilities across a broad geography stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the Andaman Sea—and how these developments could influence the balance between the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia. Through its soft power diplomacy and energy engineering vision—especially via TİKA—Turkey holds the potential to amplify its regional role.

I. STRATEGIC SCENARIO VALUATIONS FOR CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

States’ economic systems are not linear—they are dynamic systems that produce chain effects. Let us assume each state holds six strategic cards: energy demand intensity, energy supply diversification, the openness and security of logistic routes, the capacity of strategic reserves, the distraction level of rivals, and international price stability and quota-free markets. The simultaneous optimal condition of all six—assuming each is an “ace”—yields a classical probability of 1 in 46,656. This rarity applies equally to the scenario in which all six turn out negatively. Nevertheless, in geopolitical terms, such jackpot-like events are not impossible.

Should a state achieve this ideal scenario, it would breathe easier in energy diplomacy, reduce military expenditures, expand its diplomatic maneuverability, maintain an uninterrupted supply chain, accelerate its innovation pace, and enhance economic sustainability. But disruption in even one variable—for instance, global volatility in energy prices or port traffic slowdown due to a strike in Thailand—could fundamentally alter the entire energy equation.

China’s energy security remains structurally constrained by the so-called “Malacca Dilemma.” While efforts like the Kyaukpyu route, Central Asian pipelines, and Arctic LNG corridors attempt to diversify this dependency, ensuring these routes are simultaneously safe, economical, open, and pass through stable regimes is tantamount to rolling six aces at once. If China realizes this ideal, it would achieve flexibility in energy supply chains, optimal logistics costs, the capacity to focus military attention from the South China Sea toward Taiwan, and a competitive edge through low-cost industrial sourcing.

Conversely, tensions with Thailand’s neighbors could lead to supply delays at Thai ports, disrupting U.S. military logistics in the Philippines. Should China increase LNG imports via the Arctic, and Europe opt for Qatari over American LNG, the U.S. could suffer significant losses. Thus, major powers must simulate even seemingly unlikely scenarios. True intelligence lies not in calculating probabilities, but in foreseeing what appears improbable—by understanding its systemic underpinnings, timelines, and substitutes.

II. REGIONAL POWER DYNAMICS AND STRATEGIC FAULT LINES

Myanmar’s position along the Bay of Bengal makes it a crucial conduit for China’s energy security. Pipelines from Yunnan to Kyaukpyu were developed to reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca and are considered a bypass to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma.” The security of these pipelines is a priority not only for China but for all global actors seeking control over Indian Ocean maritime routes.

Myanmar’s internal conflicts threaten these infrastructures, posing a structural risk to China’s energy supply. However, this also increases regional and strategic interest from other energy-dependent states like India, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea. U.S. strategies to counter China’s investments emphasize infrastructure protection, promotion of alternate routes, and maritime traffic monitoring.

Cambodia, with limited offshore natural gas potential, has faced technical and financial setbacks. The Apsara field project by KrisEnergy began in 2020 but ceased in 2021 due to underperformance and financial constraints (Reuters, “KrisEnergy files for liquidation after failing to restructure,” 2021).

China’s Belt and Road investments in the Mekong Basin link Cambodia to Thailand and Myanmar, forming a high-density geostrategic triangle in energy, logistics, and security.

Thailand’s rising energy demand, industrial density, and transit position make it one of Southeast Asia’s key energy consumers. Strategic centers like Rayong Port, Map Ta Phut Industrial Zone, and Laem Chabang are not just economic—they are strategic targets. Any crisis in Myanmar could disrupt operations in these hubs, positioning Thailand as both a passive actor and a central balancing element for regional stability.

III. SECURITY OF MARITIME ROUTES AND ENERGY CORRIDORS

The Strait of Malacca—one of the critical arteries of global energy supply—mirrors, and in some parameters even exceeds, the strategic fragility and global dependency associated with the Strait of Hormuz. It remains the busiest trade and energy corridor linking Asia to Europe. However, its narrow, shallow, and congested structure has led to a growing interest in alternative routes. In this context, projects such as the Thai Land Bridge and the Kra Canal, both proposed in southern Thailand, carry the potential to reshape the region’s logistics and energy architecture.

Islands in southern Thailand, such as Phuket, with their deep-sea port capacities, direct access to the Andaman Sea, and seismically stable geological structures, are critical not only regionally but also globally. They play a vital role in Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) monitoring, undersea fiber optic cable protection, and naval power projection.

The frequent use of Phuket as a port of call by U.S. naval platforms—such as the USS Key West submarines and the USS Emory S. Land resupply vessels—underscores its strategic utility for maritime surveillance and logistical support.

The region’s undersea cable network is not only vital to internet infrastructure but also holds significance for cybersecurity, signals intelligence, and military communications. Beneath its tourist-facing image, Phuket and its surrounding geography may emerge as hotspots for intensified geopolitical competition in the near future due to these strategic infrastructures.

IV. THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND GUAM: PILLARS OF GLOBAL SECURITY

The Strait of Malacca and Guam are twin pillars of the United States’ strategy and power projection in the Indo-Pacific. While Malacca represents a strategic chokepoint that must be protected, Guam functions as the logistics and military fulcrum enabling the U.S. to secure that very presence. Together, they form the backbone of U.S. security and defense policy in the region.

With approximately 90,000 vessel passages annually, Malacca is a lifeline for global trade and energy flows. Guam, on the other hand, is the U.S.’s most advanced forward base in the Pacific, enabling real-time power projection. Given that over 80% of China’s energy and trade routes pass through the Strait of Malacca, the chokepoint presents a strategic vulnerability for Beijing—prompting efforts to identify alternative routes.

As is well known, the U.S. champions freedom of navigation in all maritime domains. The Strait of Malacca, therefore, serves not only as a gateway for supporting U.S. allies in the region but also as a strategic corridor for maintaining military presence. For China, however, any disruption to Malacca would inflict a major economic and energy shock—thus making it a pressure point in broader strategic calculations.

V. CHINA’S MYANMAR CARD: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MALACCA

In an attempt to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with the so-called “Malacca Dilemma”, China is positioning the Kyaukpyu Port and associated pipelines on Myanmar’s western coast as priority energy and logistics corridors. Similarly, Cambodian port investments play a central role in China’s ambitions for naval projection, trade route diversification, and regional influence.

China’s engagement with Myanmar and Cambodia is not solely about energy security; it also enhances naval maneuverability. The Kyaukpyu–Kunming pipelines, constructed in Myanmar, can transport around 22 million tons of crude oil and 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. This allows for direct transfer of hydrocarbons from the Middle East and Africa to China’s Yunnan Province, bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Malacca. This infrastructure, part of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), represents one of the few overland routes enabling China’s access to the Indian Ocean, diversifying its trade and energy inflows and thereby bolstering its global economic outreach.

In Cambodia, while offshore natural gas potential is limited, Chinese investments in port infrastructure are rapidly expanding. The modernization of the Ream Naval Base could extend the operational range of the Chinese navy across the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Satellite imagery and defense analyses indicate that the facility is increasingly accessible to the Chinese military. Both Myanmar and Cambodia are thus key nodes in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure diplomacy.

This strategy encompasses not only economic goals but also maritime control and deterrence objectives. In response, the U.S. and its allies are closely monitoring these developments, recalibrating their military basing strategies, naval surveillance, and regional alliances to counterbalance China’s expanding footprint.

VI. CHINA’S A2/AD STRATEGY: ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL

China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy aims to restrict U.S. and allied forces from operating freely in East Asian waters. The overarching goal is to neutralize the operational advantages provided by Guam and other U.S. forward bases. This doctrine is especially relevant in China’s “near seas”—the East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait—and seeks to complicate foreign intervention during potential conflict scenarios.

The strategy targets both the First Island Chain (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo) and the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam. China’s growing military and economic presence in Myanmar and Cambodia grants it easier access to the Indian Ocean, thereby weakening U.S. influence over the Strait of Malacca. In countermeasure, the U.S. has adopted a strategy of dispersed presence, seeking allied ports and alternative logistical routes beyond Guam. This decentralized posture represents a highly intelligent adaptation to China’s A2/AD challenge. If Beijing succeeds in constraining U.S. force projection from Guam and other outposts, America’s regional influence would be severely diminished.

Accordingly, regional flashpoints such as the Thailand–Myanmar crisis should be interpreted not just as isolated tensions but as proxy manifestations of deeper strategic contests—including China’s A2/AD imperatives.

VII. MINERAL POLICIES, RARE EARTH ELEMENTS, AND THE TURKISH FACTOR

Myanmar’s northern regions account for approximately 10% of global rare earth element production—materials essential to strategic industries such as battery technology, chip manufacturing, electric vehicles, and solar panels. These resources are not only economically valuable but also hold considerable geopolitical significance. Given China’s reliance on these minerals for its technological supply chains, any internal unrest or external intervention in Myanmar could have severe consequences for global manufacturing and distribution systems.

Thailand, on the other hand, plays an increasingly prominent role in the Asia-Pacific mining competition, thanks to its high-value deposits of gold, tungsten, and lithium. Potential subsea mineral fields along its Andaman coastline could open up new geo-economic frontiers in the near future. In Cambodia, Chinese investments in phosphate and mineral reserves demonstrate that strategic non-energy raw materials are also part of the broader geopolitical tug-of-war.

VIII. THE U.S. RIMLAND DOCTRINE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND MIGRATION

The United States considers Southeast Asia a pivotal “rimland” region in its effort to contain China. Strategic enhancements to military installations in Thailand—such as the proposed $200 million investment in upgrading the U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield—reflect this containment strategy. In tandem, Washington’s diplomatic initiatives leverage the instability in Myanmar and Cambodia to expand its toolkit via Thailand.

Concurrently, climate change is exacerbating regional resource scarcity and jeopardizing water and food security, thereby fueling increased migration from Myanmar and Cambodia to Thailand (estimated between 1 to 2 million individuals). The construction of dams along the Mekong River—especially the 11 major ones controlled by China—has a direct impact on downstream nations’ water security, heightening regional hydro-political tensions. Islands around Phuket are becoming increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

Behind the façade of a vibrant tourism industry lies a demographic reality shaped by irregular migration from Myanmar and Cambodia. Field observations suggest a significant number of unregistered individuals engage in informal economic activities while evading local law enforcement. This unregulated population flow poses new-generation security threats for Thailand, including resource strain, housing crises, human rights violations, and the expansion of organized crime networks—vulnerabilities capable of undermining national stability.

For the United States, Thailand’s tensions with Cambodia and Myanmar are not merely humanitarian or democratic concerns, but serve a strategic purpose in the broader goal of encircling China. This alignment underscores that Guam’s strategic sphere extends as far west as the Mekong basin, reaffirming the crisis’s global dimensions. Due to their geographic positions—particularly those in the Andaman Sea—Thailand’s islands could function as forward outposts for intelligence collection and maritime security operations within the U.S. rimland strategy.

CONCLUSION: THE TECTONIC SHIFTS OF THE INDO-PACIFIC AND TURKEY’S ROLE

Echoing Henry Kissinger’s principle to “notice what is not immediately visible,” every development surrounding Thailand triggers new moves on the global chessboard. The tectonic shifts across Southeast Asia present Turkey with both an expanded sphere of influence and a unique opportunity to offer engineered solutions to global challenges.

The ongoing developments along the Thailand–Myanmar–Cambodia axis generate not only regional but global implications for energy security, supply chain continuity, and the control of strategic resources. The U.S.–China rivalry compels each actor in the region to redefine their strategic positioning, creating new maneuvering space for versatile diplomatic players such as Turkey.

A signal of unrest originating in Phuket could activate radar systems in Guam; internal conflict in Myanmar might disrupt petrochemical production in Thailand; and any narrowing of the Strait of Malacca could raise energy prices in Europe, setting off a domino effect.

Amid such risks, Turkey emerges as a neutral yet strategic actor under the visionary leadership of Foreign Minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan, bolstered by TİKA’s effective soft power outreach. Through its active participation in humanitarian diplomacy, development cooperation, and multilateral platforms (UN, ASEAN, G20), Ankara is positioned as a viable mediator in South Asian conflicts. Leveraging its expertise in energy engineering and mining, Turkey can contribute to regional resource governance, while its intelligence and security capabilities could help curb illicit activity.

This integrated approach not only elevates Turkey’s regional role but also strengthens its standing on the global geopolitical stage—poised as a strategic balancer between East and West.

Prepared by: Berna Kanbay

Chief Advisor to the President, ASAD & ASAV

INTRODUCTION:

The Strait of Hormuz stands as an indispensable geopolitical artery for global energy security and the continuity of world trade. Unlike the Suez and Panama Canals, Hormuz has no viable alternative; this situation places the Strait at the very heart of the international system’s fragile balance. It is pertinent to recall Abraham Lincoln’s wisdom: “Do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?” In this context, it is evident that a strategic passage like the Strait of Hormuz should serve as a platform for cooperation, not conflict.

This strategic position has naturally become the focal point for geopolitical tensions and international relations in the region. Lacking an alternative sea route for oil transportation, and thus described as a “vulnerable lifeline,” the preservation of navigation freedom in the Strait of Hormuz is a priority for global actors. Connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, and facilitating the passage of approximately 20% of the world’s oil, the Strait is a veritable fulcrum for the global economy and energy security. Its status under international maritime law is upheld by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regulations, which guarantee the right of transit passage. Although the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it largely adheres to its principles in practice. Being officially party to the convention would further strengthen the legal basis for the transit rights of its naval forces and support the maritime security expectations of its allies.

This analysis series focuses on far-reaching cascading scenarios in the event of a Hormuz closure, spanning from Brent crude prices to petrodollar flows, international trade, national tax revenues, potential political shifts, likely new collaborations, and the economic balances of nations. In a scenario of closure, an increase in hybrid warfare elements, such as cyberattacks targeting commercial infrastructure or energy systems, is also among the foreseen risks. In this context, attention must be drawn to why alternative corridors such as Türkiye’s TANAP, TAP, TurkStream, Eastern Mediterranean LNG projects, and the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline need to be rapidly strengthened. It must be emphasized that international support for Türkiye in this regard would benefit all peoples of the world.

Establishing a cause-and-effect relationship makes it easy to understand that fluctuations in the production and distribution roles of fossil fuels will automatically lead to volatility in energy and food prices, given that energy is consumed in the production of all our food, beverages, and other goods. For example, the price of beef consumed in Vietnam is directly influenced by the costs of producing the fertilizer used for the corn feed the cattle consume, the processing, storage, and distribution of that feed, and changes in freight prices during the import of that fertilizer, for instance, from Argentina to Vietnam. Furthermore, disruptions in logistical routes from Argentina to Vietnam would result in a complete blockage of this supply chain. The direct impact of natural gas, a raw material for nitrogen-based fertilizers derived from ammonia, on the security of the food chain should also be assessed within this scope. This is why the crisis will not be limited to points where energy security is at risk but will trigger a global security, energy, food, and diplomatic crisis. It would not be surprising for actors who intentionally pave the way for such a global crisis, whose effects could last for years, to be isolated from the international community.

Upon examining the immediate vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz, it is evident that secure military bases and energy and industrial facilities, which are strategic for the entire world, are not located far from the Strait. This fact indicates that it would not be possible for global actors to abandon the Strait of Hormuz to its own devices. On the other hand, within the framework of international maritime law, international passages like the Strait of Hormuz are subject to a “transit passage” regime. This regime guarantees the right of unhindered passage for all vessels, including warships. In this context, as explained further in our analysis, the importance of “Energy Supply” for the world is no less than what “the Strait of Hormuz” represents for Iran. Therefore, in the event of a Hormuz closure, it is foreseen that cascading crises would compel all governments to resort to economic sanctions rather than new investments, and the populations of various countries could suffer for the same reason.

I. THE GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT

The Strait of Hormuz is a gateway through which oil and natural gas-rich countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq access world markets. Iran, situated on the Strait’s northern coast, holds a geographical advantage. For Iran, the Strait is a crucial component of both its defense strategy and a potential deterrent. A review of recent history reveals that the threat of closing the Strait has been a tool Iran occasionally employs as leverage in international negotiations.

Recalling the rule in card games that “even the worst hand can become a nightmare for the opponent if played correctly,” it is clear that closing the Strait of Hormuz would be a game-breaking move. This is because a Hormuz closure would also pose an extremely significant problem for Iran’s own oil exports.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain) are entirely dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for their oil and natural gas exports. A closure of the Strait would deliver a direct and devastating blow to their economies. For this reason, Gulf countries support regional stability and navigation security. Global Energy Consumers (China, Japan, India, South Korea, European countries, and other Asian countries) purchase approximately 70% of the oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Europe is a significant market for LNG arriving via Hormuz. These countries would be severely impacted by the adverse effects on global energy prices and supply disruptions caused by a Strait closure. In other words, a closure of the Strait would directly affect not only regional countries but also major consumer countries like China, Japan, India, the European Union, and the United States in terms of energy supply security. For these reasons, the security of the Strait of Hormuz is a prerequisite for international peace and prosperity, and the Strait holds a special position in terms of maritime law and diplomacy.

In this context, as of 2025, Israeli attacks on Iranian territory have re-escalated tensions over the Strait of Hormuz; Iran’s strong retaliations have deepened regional instability. These developments, occurring just before the nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, have once again demonstrated how susceptible energy transit routes are to military risks. While Iraq is not yet directly intended to be involved in the center of this tension, it faces the risk of becoming a conflict zone again through militia groups and proxy forces. The presence of armed groups close to Iran on Iraqi soil increases the likelihood of a conflict around Hormuz spilling over into Iraq. When considering the potential subsequent scenarios, in the event of a possible Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. bases in Iraq could become targets. This carries the risk of pushing Iraq to a breaking point not only in terms of energy but also military logistics.

II. CROSS-BORDER RAMIFICATIONS OF PROXY WARS

In the event of Iran closing Hormuz, one of the most severely affected countries would be Iraq. This is because Iraq has developed a significant dependence on Iran through economic and energy ties. Iraq, which imports electricity and natural gas from Iran, also has logistical mobility in economic border crossings with Iran. The restriction of these crossings would directly impact Iraq’s internal economic balances, thereby affecting the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) as well. Speculations regarding the use of KRG territory in Israeli operations against Iran have rendered the Kurdistan Regional Government vulnerable to potential Iranian reactions. This situation carries the risk of multi-front instability, similar to how third parties became conflict zones in the 1991 Gulf War.

In recent years, the geography of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has emerged as an extremely pivotal area where strategic interactions of regional and international actors are concentrated. Within this framework, it is noted that certain regionally supported groups have periodically conducted actions targeting some international military elements within KRG borders, which has shifted the region’s geopolitical position to a more delicate equilibrium. The attack on K-1 Base near Kirkuk in late 2019, which resulted in the loss of an international civilian contractor’s life, demonstrated how such interactions can heighten regional sensitivities. This chain of developments is part of a multi-dimensional process extending to a critical incident on January 3, 2020. Similarly, rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on Erbil’s Harir Air Base in 2021 and 2023 reveal the continued propensity of regional actors to utilize asymmetric capabilities to convey strategic messages. It is observed that these actions, claimed by entities such as the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” aim both to influence the KRG’s internal security dynamics and to keep international presences in the region under constant scrutiny. In this context, the KRG is subjected to strategic pressure not only due to the presence of certain Kurdish opposition groups, but also because this geographical area is periodically used as a zone of indirect contact. The persistence of such on-the-ground dynamics could further sharpen the existing balances in Iraq’s internal politics. Indeed, such interactions occurring before Iraq’s general elections, scheduled for November 2025, bear the potential to deeply affect not only voter behavior but also Iraq’s foreign policy maneuvering capability.

III. BRENT CRUDE OIL

The security of energy supply is directly related not only to the production of petroleum fuels but also to their export capacity, in other words, the security of logistics. Fluctuations in Brent crude oil prices have the direct ability to touch the nerve endings of the global economy. When considered in the context of the Israel-Iran tension, the impact of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz on Brent prices becomes even more pronounced. A renewed tightening of sanctions against Iran and the withdrawal of Iranian oil from the market will create not only a physical supply shortage but also psychological market pressure. In this context, given Iran’s dependence on energy exports, closing Hormuz would be a devastating step for its own economy. It is clear that the closure of Hormuz would serve no rational global benefit. However, it is understood that for the Iranian regime, this step is seen as a strategic card, especially for redirecting internal pressures outwards.

IV. HOW WOULD THE GLOBAL ECONOMY BE AFFECTED IF HORMUZ CLOSES?

A complete blockage of transit in the Strait of Hormuz is expected to push Brent prices into the 120-150 USD/barrel range. As a continuation of this scenario, there will be risks of up to a 20% increase in freight costs, disruptions in logistics chains, increased costs in industrial production, and a contraction in global trade. Costs will rise in all logistics and energy-dependent sectors, and developing countries will struggle with foreign exchange pressure and increased import costs. Global inflation will rise, trade volume will shrink, growth rates will fall, and the risk of global recession will strengthen. The scenario of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the pillars supporting the global system, will, due to its geopolitical consequences, simultaneously pressure not only energy flows but all parameters of the international security architecture. There is no utility function that can rationalize a risk of this scale on the basis of strategic interest; therefore, the closure of Hormuz is a mathematically negative fixed equation for global actors. For this reason, the crises triggered by a Hormuz closure will paralyze the investment environment, forcing states to produce sanctions rather than new investments. This chain reaction will affect not only governments but also societies in different geographies, leading to a decline in global quality of life.

V. TÜRKİYE’S DIPLOMATIC APPROACH IN LINE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

Türkiye has consistently maintained a transparent, peaceful, and law-abiding transit regime through the Istanbul and Çanakkale Straits. This practice, guaranteed by the Montreux Convention, strengthens the Republic of Türkiye’s position as a reliable actor in international trade. Iran’s strategic use of the threat to close this vital passage, even in matters not directly concerning the Strait of Hormuz, highlights the importance of using deterrence with a sense of responsibility in energy geopolitics. In contrast, Türkiye has always built a fair, accountable, and internationally legally compliant diplomacy regarding maritime passages; in this respect, it has positioned itself as not only a geographical but also a normative safe haven in energy supply security.

Türkiye’s energy arteries, formed by its TANAP, TAP, TurkStream, and Eastern Mediterranean LNG projects, serve as a strategic lifeline not only for Türkiye but also for the global system in scenarios such as a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In this context, these infrastructure projects, supported by Türkiye’s diplomatic stability and engineering capacity, function as a stability multiplier in ensuring the continuity of energy supply. Promoting Türkiye’s role in this regard within the international community will contribute to the prosperity not merely of a single state but of all humanity.

The modernization of the Iraq-Türkiye Oil Pipeline (ITP) could enable the regaining of approximately 1 million barrels per day capacity. The expansion of Ceyhan Terminal’s LNG processing capabilities could contribute up to an ambitious yet achievable projection of 8% to Europe’s natural gas supply. Integrated LNG hubs to be established in the Eastern Mediterranean could create a new route for Egyptian and Israeli gas to Europe. The transformation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) ports represents not merely a geographical but a strategic leap.

Rationality lies in the integration of these investments with diplomacy. At this point, the modernization of the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline, the expansion of Ceyhan LNG capacities, and the establishment of energy hubs in the Eastern Mediterranean are extremely vital for the energy supply security of the entire world. The transformation of TRNC ports into logistical bases is a diplomatic vision and a strategy that will support regional peace. It is beneficial for the global recognition of Türkiye’s ingenuity in producing alternatives for energy supply security, establishing it as a reliable haven for the entire world.

VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE

In the event of a Hormuz closure, the UN Security Council and international legal mechanisms are expected to activate diplomatic and legal avenues to protect freedom of navigation. Countries with high engineering and diplomatic capabilities, such as Türkiye, are expected to be the cornerstones of this process through law-based peaceful solutions and cooperation models. The assumption that states party to maritime law would hesitate in protecting transit passage freedom and ensuring the sustainability of maritime trade routes is invalid, both practically and fundamentally.

This is because these states are the maintainers of the normative order created by the UNCLOS regime and the systemic guarantors of the freedom of the seas; contrary behavior would directly produce a threat to their own maritime jurisdictions. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has guaranteed the right of unhindered passage and the transit passage regime through straits like Hormuz. Therefore, when the continuity of maritime trade is threatened as a natural consequence of the violation of navigation freedom, it is expected to result in the activation of international legal intervention mechanisms. Such a scenario would necessitate the UN Security Council’s diplomatic initiatives and international cooperation aimed at ensuring the security of maritime trade.

As Türkiye has always done, adopting a high-level diplomatic position that multi-dimensionally analyzes the rising geopolitical turbulence around Hormuz and Iran’s asymmetric expansion strategy carried out through proxy actors in the Iraqi theater, will offer a structural contribution to the regional peace architecture. Within this framework, an institutionalized security cooperation mechanism between Iraq and Türkiye will not only reinforce border security but will also function as a preventive strategic barrier neutralizing all external proxy cards. Türkiye’s active role in security diplomacy, beyond energy diplomacy, represents a multi-vector intervention capacity that can rebalance regional and global equations.

VII. GLOBAL POWER BALANCES AND ALLIANCES

A potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz will force a re-coding of not only energy routes but also the strategic reflexes of regional actors. Many different actors, including oil-exporting and importing countries, Western nations, Gulf countries, Iraq, and even Israel, will feel the need to recalibrate their positions.

In such a high-tension crisis environment, the potential interactions of Tehran’s policies, conducted through regional proxy actors, risk further complicating the existing situation. However, upon careful examination of on-the-ground developments and international dynamics, structural changes in this approach are being observed: The periodically weakening operational capabilities of some groups in Lebanon, certain restrictions on Iran in Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen facing increasing international scrutiny and isolation, indicate that this regional engagement model may no longer be able to generate the same comprehensive environmental support and strategic leverage effect as before. This situation calls into question the potential of any regional pressure mechanism Iran might contemplate deploying via the Strait of Hormuz to achieve its expected strategic benefits.

In this context, the failure of Tehran’s regional engagements to yield anticipated results and the potential weakening of the so-called “Shia Crescent” sphere of influence are likely to exert significant pressure on Iran’s domestic politics and regional strategies. The accumulation of such external factors and economic hardships could reshape not only regional power balances but also global actors’ policies towards Iran. The combination of ongoing internal and external challenges could limit Tehran’s strategic options, potentially leading to notable changes in the country’s future trajectory.

On the other hand, the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz is expected to function as a trigger for the formation of new balances. Energy supply crises create new alliances. In this context, Gulf countries, major energy consumers in Asia, and Western countries can be expected to increase their energy security-focused collaborations. International organizations may develop new mechanisms for maritime trade security. This process holds significant opportunities for Türkiye to solidify its role as an energy hub and a diplomatic bridge.

VIII. ENERGY LOGISTICS AND HORMUZ

Another critical topic, as important as energy security, is energy logistics. The cessation of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would paralyze not only oil flows but also LNG transportation. Notably, the vast majority of Qatar’s LNG exports pass through this Strait. A Hormuz closure would cause deep disruptions in the global LNG market, leading to consequences such as supply bottlenecks in Europe during the winter months. Türkiye’s vision for TANAP, TAP, TurkStream, and Eastern Mediterranean LNG terminals carries not merely national but international strategic value at this juncture. The logistical continuity of these projects would reduce dependence on single choke points like Hormuz and contribute to a multi-centric understanding of energy security.

CONCLUSION:

A closure of the Strait of Hormuz would constitute a stress test not just for energy markets, but for the fundamental architecture of free trade, diplomacy, and security that underpins the international system. All these variables indicate that Iran’s intended regional pressure mechanism via Hormuz may not yield the expected leverage effect.

In this scenario, Türkiye, by integrating its strategic pipelines, its international standing in the legal sphere, and its diplomatic acumen, emerges not merely as an energy hub, but as a responsible actor within the global system and a reliable haven for the entire world. Türkiye’s capacity for constructive action, diplomacy, and engineering capabilities demonstrates that it is one of the few actors capable of transforming this crisis scenario into an opportunity.

It is evident that a scenario profoundly disrupting global energy supply security, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the escalating tensions between Iran and Israel, would further deepen the impacts of existing Iranian embargoes on global energy markets. Such geopolitical uncertainties triggering global energy bottlenecks make the search for alternative routes and reliable suppliers vital. In this strategic context, Türkiye’s potential to diversify regional and international collaborations is of critical importance. For example, the entry into force of energy transit security agreements with Romania and Bulgaria in the Black Sea would both contribute to regional stability and strengthen the potential for an alternative energy corridor to the West. Similarly, establishing LNG cooperation with non-Greek actors in the Eastern Mediterranean (e.g., Lebanon, Egypt) would enable the diversification of energy sources in the region, increasing resilience against geopolitical risks. Organizing bilateral energy security forums with major energy-consuming countries in Asia (South Korea, Japan, India) would elevate Türkiye to a more central position in the global energy market, concretizing long-term and rational energy gains. Furthermore, engineering forums organized for the logistical integration of the TurkStream, TANAP, and TAP pipelines would maximize Türkiye’s energy transit capacity by increasing the efficiency of existing infrastructure.

Such technical and diplomatic collaborations would elevate Türkiye beyond merely a network of pipelines and transit points, transforming it into a key enabler of regional stability and global energy security. Türkiye’s consistently demonstrated proactive and balancing approaches will provide concrete rational benefits in minimizing geopolitical risks and strengthening international energy cooperation.

Prepared on: 2 June 2025 – Istanbul
Prepared by: Berna Kanbay
Senior Advisor to the President, ASAD

I. Introduction: Türkiye’s Geostrategic Posture and the Emergence of a New Diplomatic Terrain

While reciprocal prisoner exchanges during the Russia–Ukraine conflict underscore that diplomacy remains a functioning mechanism, the volatile and fragile nature of ongoing dynamics in the region continues to raise profound concerns. Within this complex strategic landscape, Türkiye has pursued a multi-layered and impartial diplomatic engagement, grounded in political foresight and geopolitical responsibility.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s direct dialogues with multiple global leaders have reinforced intergovernmental trust channels, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan has epitomized shuttle diplomacy through critical engagements both in Moscow with President Vladimir Putin and in Kyiv with President Volodymyr Zelensky. These developments have not only solidified Türkiye’s role as a credible mediator but have also substantiated the architecture of its multidimensional foreign policy doctrine.

On Monday, 2 June 2025, at the opening of a pivotal summit in Istanbul, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan—formerly Head of National Intelligence—remarked, “The eyes of the world are upon us. What truly matters is the attainment of sustainable peace.” He further emphasized the strategic significance of the support extended by the Trump administration in the United States, highlighting the international weight behind this process.

Minister Hakan Fidan led the Turkish delegation observing and facilitating the high-level dialogue between Russia and Ukraine. The delegation included Director of National Intelligence İbrahim Kalın, Chief of the General Staff Gen. Metin Gürak, Naval Forces Commander Adm. Ercüment Tatlıoğlu and Ambassador Mehmet Samsar, head of the Ministry’s Russia–Ukraine–Caucasus desk. Russia was represented by Deputy Head of State Vladimir Medinsky, GRU Military Intelligence Chief Kostyukov, and several deputy defense ministers. Ukraine’s delegation, led by Deputy Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, included Deputy Foreign Minister Sergiy Kyslytsya, Deputy Head of the SBU (Domestic Intelligence) Oleksandr Poklad, and Deputy Chief of the SZRU (Foreign Intelligence) Oleh Luhovskyi.

According to Anadolu Agency, Ukraine held prior consultations with representatives from the UK, Germany and Italy, indicating Kyiv’s intent to align its diplomatic positioning with the European security architecture. President Zelensky’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte further reaffirmed Ukraine’s strategic trajectory toward transatlantic integration. This dialogue underscored Kyiv’s desire not merely for symbolic partnership but for concrete leverage in ensuring coordinated Western pressure on Moscow should the diplomatic pathway falter.

Following these engagements, on 1 June 2025, Ukraine launched the covert operation “Spider Web” reportedly orchestrated over an 18-month planning horizon. The complexity and scale of the operation reflect the extent of intelligence entanglements now unfolding in the region. Russian-aligned sources suggest that the Kremlin is preparing an “asymmetric and disruptive” response.

II. A Silent Sabotage or the Strategic ‘Endgame’?

As global diplomacy turned its gaze toward the prospective peace table in Istanbul, Ukraine’s FPV drone strikes on deep-strike Russian air bases on 1 June created seismic ripples akin to a modern Pearl Harbor moment.

These attacks, reportedly launched via mobile truck-based platforms after extensive operational planning, targeted Olenya, Belaya, Engels and Murmansk—each symbolic of Russia’s strategic air power.

Far beyond the tactical domain, this assault appears to have been a calculated disruption of Russia’s deterrence posture—a geopolitical gambit reminiscent of an “endgame card” in strategic theory. In the game of bridge, such cards are not played for surprise alone, but to fundamentally alter the rhythm of play. Similarly, the FPV drone assault may have aimed not to reverse battlefield fortunes, but to undermine the psychological architecture of the impending negotiation process.

The deliberate timing of the “Spider Web” operation—executed on the very eve of the planned Istanbul peace negotiations and as delegations arrived in Türkiye—raises critical questions. While tactically assertive, this maneuver may incur long-term strategic costs for Kyiv, including diminished credibility at the diplomatic table and potential erosion of trust among its Western allies.

III. Türkiye’s Role: Rational Resilience in Diplomatic Architecture

Since 2022, Türkiye’s balanced engagement with both Kyiv and Moscow has distinguished it as one of the rare actors capable of maintaining principled equilibrium under conditions of acute conflict.

As a NATO member committed to alliance solidarity, Ankara has nonetheless redefined its stance through a doctrine of “connected autonomy,” privileging national interests without succumbing to bloc-based determinism.

This strategic orientation has been shaped by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s multidimensional foreign policy vision and institutionalized further under the stewardship of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Fidan’s integration of strategic depth, intelligence foresight, and technical sophistication into diplomacy has positioned Türkiye not only as a mediator, but also as a reliable builder of trust in regional crises.

The Istanbul negotiations represent a tangible projection of this doctrine, affirming Türkiye’s capacity to contribute not merely at the political level, but through a holistic infrastructure spanning energy security, defense architecture and logistical resilience. In this context, Türkiye stands among the few states with the structural potential to play a sustained and constructive role in post-conflict reconstruction processes.

IV. The Geopolitics of FPV Drone Warfare

The Ukraine operation’s use of FPV drones deployed via mobile truck-based systems signals a transformative leap in cyber-physical warfare. The fusion of civilian and military domains, enabled by low-cost, high-impact hybrid platforms, blurs conventional battlefield boundaries.

This shift heralds not only a new era of asymmetric military confrontation, but also a strategic threshold where non-state actors may eventually acquire similar capacities.          The convergence of drone systems with open-source AI technologies poses profound threats to global security architectures, offering militant groups an unprecedented level of operational reach. The resultant threat landscape is not confined to the kinetic domain. It now includes cognitive warfare, algorithmic intelligence and digital infrastructure sabotage.

Within this context, entities such as TUSAŞ, ASELSAN, and private- sector leaders like BAYKAR and others must be reconceptualized—not merely as industrial actors, but as sovereign strategic platforms, central to the architecture of national security and technological sovereignty.

V. President Zelensky’s Geostrategic Maneuver: A Very Tactical Victory Shadowed by Strategic Risks

While Ukraine’s leadership appears intent on leveraging its recent offensive to gain a stronger negotiating position, the timing of this maneuver may provoke ethical inquiries across Western public discourse. Indeed, some analyses suggest that the attack could inadvertently undermine Kyiv’s diplomatic standing by derailing potential negotiations.

This evolving landscape has brought the concept of “crisis diplomacy engineering” to the forefront. The intricate balance between timing, symbolism and public sentiment necessitates not only political calculation but also refined psychological strategy. For strategic actors such as Türkiye, this underscores the urgent need to cultivate a form of diplomacy that is not merely reactive but strategically proactive.

Thus, although this initiative may yield short-term psychological gains, it also carries the potential to erode the pro-Ukrainian political consensus in Europe. Such erosion may, paradoxically, strengthen Türkiye’s positioning as a credible mediator. As the only NATO-aligned country maintaining constructive neutrality in this conflict matrix—where multiple non-NATO actors are at play—Türkiye’s leadership in advancing ethics-driven peace strategies could foster a renewed climate of public trust within the European arena.

VI. Russia’s Response and the Strategic Fragility of the Emerging Energy Architecture

Simultaneous disruptions at critical military and logistical hubs such as Belaya, Olenya, Severomorsk, and Kursk reveal not only the vulnerabilities in Russia’s tactical military capabilities but also a temporary paralysis in its strategic energy logistics infrastructure. Particularly concerning are the allegations of compromised nuclear assets in Severomorsk and uncertainties across the Arctic corridor signaling that conventional definitions of energy security are increasingly obsolete.

The current juncture demands a redefinition of energy security, not solely in terms of reserve availability or supply continuity, but across the axes of maintenance assurance, cyber control stability, multilayered logistical resilience and climate-induced fragility. This multifaceted vulnerability matrix can be strategically advantageous for a select group of actors capable of integrating technical competence with diplomatic mission.

In this context, Türkiye’s robust engineering capacity transcends conventional supply capabilities, providing a strategic form of intermediate intervention—capable of repair, repurposing, and monitoring energy infrastructures during crises. With advanced capabilities in turbomachinery, high-pressure gas regulation, and next-generation turbine systems, Türkiye offers not just NATO members but the entire energy transit corridor a reliable technical security umbrella.

Consequently, Türkiye’s role in the regional energy equation necessitates a new conceptual framing—defined at the intersection of diplomacy and engineering. A proposed “energy diplomacy engineering” architecture would reimagine energy corridors not merely as conduits of commerce, but as instruments for generating geopolitical
elasticity.

This perspective could establish a diplomatic platform rooted in sustainable operations during peace and decisive technical interventions during crises. In doing so, Türkiye would solidify its stature not only as a conduit for energy transfer but as a producer of regional stability and a codifier of systemic security. Indeed, the wartime damage inflicted upon energy infrastructure elevates modernization and rehabilitation to matters of economic recovery and long-term sustainability—extending far beyond mere reconstruction.

According to joint assessments by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, an estimated $1.2 billion USD is required to meet only the very most urgent repair needs of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These include the restoration of power transmission systems, heating infrastructure, mobile heating units, and other critical assets.

The extensive destruction wrought by the war has left deep scars, particularly in the energy domain, transforming reconstruction efforts into high-tech, multi-dimensional endeavors that require seamless coordination. In this environment, countries like Türkiye—with both engineering depth and regional legitimacy—offer more than just physical repairs: they are key to achieving humanitarian sustainability, energy resilience, and regional equilibrium.

Accordingly, Türkiye is mobilizing its high-tech capacity within a visionary framework of “humanitarian engineering diplomacy”, prioritizing collective resilience in post-conflict reconstruction.

Integrated within multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such strategic contributions elevate Türkiye not just as a partner in crisis management, but as a constructive actor delivering technically rational solutions toward systemic trust-building in volatile regions.

VII. TİKA, AFAD and the Architecture of Next-Generation Humanitarian Diplomacy

Following the global retrenchment of USAID in the post-Trump era, a critical vacuum has emerged in the international humanitarian system. In numerous crisis-stricken geographies—from Syria, Gaza, and Afghanistan to Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine—AFAD (Türkiye’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) has demonstrated a capacity not only for emergency response but also for long-term infrastructure development and strategic recovery planning.

This institutional evolution has given rise to the & strategic geopolitics of aid; The AFAD model now encompasses technical permanence, spatial stability, and diplomatic imprint—functioning simultaneously across humanitarian, infrastructural, and geopolitical dimensions.

In this regard, broader international support for AFAD’s operations would be of significant strategic value in converting Türkiye’s humanitarian expertise into a regional vector of soft power. Such a model should be interpreted by the international community not merely as aid deployment, but as a mechanism of diplomatic prestige and technical presence.

Within this framework, a “humanitarian engineering map” that integrates technical aid with foreign policy architecture—particularly in geographies where Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and AFAD operate in tandem—would serve as a strategic asset.

Conclusion: The Engineering of Peace

Peace platforms must be reimagined not only as spaces for dialogue but also as laboratories for technical problem-solving. Sustainable solutions can only be forged through the integration of diplomacy and engineering. In this respect, Türkiye distinguishes itself as the only regional actor capable of delivering solutions through a synthesis of diplomacy, engineering, energy expertise, and humanitarian commitment. This multidimensional capability forms the cornerstone of a prospective “Turkish Peace Engineering Doctrine.” It is through this hybrid architecture—blending diplomacy, technology, and humanitarianism—that Türkiye is poised to evolve from a regional stabilizer into a global solution provider.

The emerging security architecture of the post-2025 era now demands actors who are not merely interested in prosecuting wars, but in designing peace. Modern peacebuilding is no longer defined by the absence of conflict alone; rather, it requires an intricate, multi-tiered engineering of institutional resilience, diplomatic continuity, and civil-military balance. Accordingly, nations possessing the foresight, legitimacy, and structural reconstruction capacity to shape this peace architecture must act not only with military deterrence but with diplomatic intuition and technological agility.

Türkiye, in this new era, is not simply adapting to a changing global order—it is poised to embody a newly emergent role:
The Diplomatic Engineer of Peace.

Prepared on: 26 May 2025 – Istanbul
Prepared by: Berna Kanbay
Senior Advisor to the President, ASAD

I. Introduction:

The absence of a lasting ceasefire until the winter of 2026 will not merely prolong the frontline stalemate between Russia and Ukraine—it will also signal a profound transformation in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, ushering in a new phase of geopolitical turbulence. In this unfolding landscape, critical issues such as energy supply security, the control of transit corridors, the sustainability of high-technology defense industries, and the operational resilience of turbomachinery infrastructure will evolve into strategic decision nodes. Within this multifaceted equation of turbulence, Türkiye emerges not only as a stabilizing force but also as a constructive and strategic actor  in reshaping the regional architecture across security, energy, and industrial domains.

This strategic assessment approaches the protracted conflict scenario through the lens of energy security, industrial infrastructure, geo-economic transition routes and technical reflexes. It evaluates Türkiye’s emerging spheres of opportunity by drawing on its engineering capacity, transit role in the energy matrix and diplomatic agility.

II. Geopolitical Gridlock of a Prolonged War: Tactical Attrition, Strategic Impasse

Throughout the first half of 2025, Russia’s intensified fortification efforts around Donbas and Zaporizhzhia, juxtaposed with Ukraine’s attritional campaign backed by multinational support, have converted the battlefield into a tactical deadlock. Both parties remain ensnared between the risks of a withdrawal at prohibitive strategic cost and the likely illusion of victory. This entrenched conflict dynamic has led to:

From Ankara’s perspective, this emergent phase necessitates the redefinition of its cross-border security buffer, the preservation of the Montreux regime’s status and the consolidation of its naval presence in the Black Sea.

III.  Industrial Fragility in Energy Corridors and Türkiye’s Alternative Positioning

The vulnerability of Ukraine’s gas storage infrastructure and the persistent targeting of Odesa’s port facilities have rendered the Black Sea corridor a domain of both logistical and energy insecurity. This scenario not only threatens energy supply chains but also severely restricts access to turbomachinery, pressurized gas systems, turbine components, and advanced compressor technologies.

As European manufacturers suspend deliveries to both Russia and Iran, a substantial void has emerged in the supply of critical equipment—particularly in sectors such as petrochemicals, refining, and LNG terminals. The deepening sanctions on Iran have created structural disruptions in the availability of Western-origin industrial systems. In this context, Turkish engineering firms, which are gaining momentum in these specialized fields, are uniquely positioned to assume the role of an “adaptive regional provider of industrial capabilities.”

With robust domestic production capabilities, expanded turbomachinery infrastructure, and integrated system solutions tailored for energy facilities, Turkish firms are poised to fill the engineering vacuum—not only in Iran but also across Central Asia, North Africa, and the Caucasus. This transition provides Türkiye with:

IV.  Türkiye’s Transit System Adaptation Amidst Geo-Economic Risks

Iran’s increasing isolation, under the weight of expansive sanctions, has led to a deterioration not only in its trade capacity but also in its ability to modernize its energy, refining, and pipeline technologies. This degradation elevates Türkiye’s role along the Caspian–Black Sea–Mediterranean axis—from a mere transit state to a technological stabilizer.

With:

Türkiye is positioning itself not simply as a transit corridor, but as a strategic center for energy production, maintenance, and security. The regional bottleneck triggered by the technological embargoes on Iran has, paradoxically, become a geopolitical leverage point for Türkiye—enabled by its growing industrial and technological sophistication.

V. NATO’s Eastern Doctrine and Strategic Fault Lines in the Southern Corridors

In the post-Vilnius landscape, NATO’s evolving doctrine has accelerated military consolidation across the Baltic–Polish axis, prompting reciprocal measures from Russia through Transnistria and the South Caucasus. These strategic recalibrations directly impact the Nakhchivan–Zangezur corridor, as well as the gas, fiber-optic, and road networks linking Georgia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan.

Türkiye’s energy and industrial partnerships along these corridors are not only instrumental in securing geo-economic fault lines but also in generating direct operational influence in the region. As a result, Ankara is poised to become a pivotal contributor in shaping the contours of strategic resilience from the Black Sea to the Caspian.

VI. Türkiye’s Multi-Layered Diplomatic Engineering: Balance, Redundancy, and Strategic Influence

In an era defined by unprecedented geopolitical flux, the Republic of Türkiye has meticulously engineered a nuanced and resilient diplomatic framework—one that masterfully orchestrates the delicate equilibrium across three pivotal strategic dimensions, thereby affirming its indispensable role as a linchpin of regional stability and global influence.

This tripartite strategy finds tangible expression in Türkiye’s protection of regional energy corridors, its steadfast commitment to the diplomatic sanctity of the Montreux Convention, and the strengthening of its defense capabilities in the Black Sea—driven by indigenous engineering excellence.

Conclusion: If No Ceasefire Is Achieved by Autumn 2025…

Should hostilities persist through the fall of 2025, several critical shifts are anticipated:

]]> https://asadplatformu.com/en/kibrista-fes-taktirmak/ Fri, 23 May 2025 10:37:39 +0000 https://asadplatformu.com/kibrista-fes-taktirmak/ Ailenin bir ayağı Ku­zey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nde. Bu du­rum 1994 yılından be­ri yılda en az bir kez gü­zel KKTC’yi ziyaret etme şansını bizlere sunuyor. Bu seferki ziyaret nişan nedeniyleydi. Kıbrıs’ta karşılaştığımız tanıdık­ların neredeyse hepsi Türk Cumhuriyetleri’nin Rum Kesimini tüm Kıbrıs’ın tek tem­silcisi olarak tanımalarını sor­du. “Satıldık be kardeş” diye tep­ki verenlere uluslararası ilişkile­rin doğasından bahsetsek de ikna edebildik mi? emin değilim.

Tam rahatladık derken Hakkâri Yüksekova Belediyesi Kıbrıs Şe­hidi Cengiz Topel’in ismini taşı­yan caddeden ismini kaldırdı ha­beriyle karşılaştık. Kıbrıs mese­lesinin en önemli simgelerinden Şehit Cengiz Topel’in ismini sil­meye çalışmak provokasyondan başka bir şey değil. Sırrı Süreyya Önder’in isminin verileceği baş­ka bir cadde yok muydu? Şehidi­ne sahip çıkmak bir milletin vaz­geçilmezi, devleti yönetenlerin ise milletine karşı mesuliyetidir.

Kıbrıs ziyaretimizi mi bekledi­niz diye düşünürken sosyal med­yada Cumhurbaşkanı Denktaş’ın eski danışmanı, Başbakanlık eski özel kalem müdürü, Dışişleri Ba­kanlığı Tanıtma Dairesi eski mü­dürü, gazeteci, yazar ve tarihçi Sabahattin İsmail’in bir paylaşı­mına denk geldim. Sabahattin İs­mail’in Kıbrıs konusundaki pay­laşımları önemli.

Güney Kıbrıs’ta ana düşüncenin dışa vurumu

İsmail, Güney Kıbrıs’ta sözde “Türk işgaline ve iki devletli çö­züm ile federasyona karşı müca­dele etmek için” “Devrimci Halk Direniş Örgütü” adlı EOKA ben­zeri yeni bir terör örgütü kurul­duğunu belirtmiş. Türk basınında çok fazla yer bulmadı. Bahse geçen oluşum 2018 yılında kurulmuş. Simgesi Yunan isyanının simge­leri olan “ateş ve balta”. Rumlar bu tip haberlerden rahatsızlık du­yuyorlar ve bu tip haberleri Tür­kiye’nin onlara karşı propaganda için çıkardığını iddia ediyorlar.

İsmail, Güney Kıbrıs’ta fede­rasyon ve iki devletli çözüm kar­şıtı “Kurtuluş 2025-Partiler Üs­tü Toplumsal ve Siyasi Hareket” isimli yeni bir siyasi hareket ku­rulduğunu da anlatmış.

Rum basını, avukat Panos Io­annidis ve gazeteci Savvas La­kovidis’in geçici koordinatörler olarak 7 Mayıs 2025’te hareketi kurmaya ve etkinleştirmeye ka­rar verdiklerini yazıyor. Hareke­tin amacı, Kıbrıs›ın Türk işga­linden kurtarılması ve AB üyesi Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti›nin her yasal vatandaşı için tüm insan hakları­nın ve temel özgürlüklerin yeni­den kazanılması ve savunulması adına yoğun ve metodik bir siyasi çaba ve kolektif seferberlik gös­terilmesi olarak açıklanmış.

Rum basınına göre hareketin hedefi, sözde Kıbrıs Cumhuriye­ti’nin, iki bölgeli iki toplumlu fe­derasyon aracılığıyla dağıtılma­sını engellemek ve Kuzeyin Türk­leştirilmesine karşı mücadele etmekmiş. Hareketin bildirisin­de Türkiye’nin çözüm istemedi­ğine, Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti’nin da­ğılmasını, Kıbrıs’ın kontrol al­tına alınmasını ve taleplerine boyun eğilmesini istediğine dem vuruyor. Bu nedenlerle, Türki­ye’ye yanıt verebilmek için Yuna­nistan’ın bir strateji değişikliği­ne olan ihtiyacından bahsediyor.

Açıklamada komik olan ise Rum halkının Avrupa’nın de­mokratik, hukuk düzeninde öz­gürce yaşamak mı, yoksa Türk hi­mayesinde fes takmak mı istedi­ğine karar vermesi vurgusu.

Biz fes taktırmak istemiyoruz

1950’lerin başında başlayan Kıbrıs sorununda barışın istikrarı, 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekatıyla sağ­landı. Sonraki süreçte birçok gö­rüşme, birçok değişen strateji, de­ğişen farklı ideolojiye sahip lider­ler birçok farklı arabulucular oldu.

İşin boyutu AB’nin 2004 yılın­da kendi yazdığı Annan Planına “hayır” diyen Rum kesimini ada­nın tümünün temsilcisi olarak içine almasıyla değişti. AB, bu hamlesiyle, Kıbrıs Türk tarafını siyasi bir aktör olarak görmediği­ni ilan etmiş oldu. Bu durum so­runu daha da işin içerisinden çı­kılmaz hale getirdi.

Rum siyasi hareketi gibi biz de Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti’nin, iki böl­geli iki toplumlu federasyon ol­masını istemiyoruz. Aslında fe­derasyona destek verenler bile, iki toplumlu, iki bölgeli bir fede­rasyonla hiçbir şey başarılama­yacağını biliyorlar.

Bu söylemin devam ettirilme­sinin nedeni yerine başka bir şey koyamamaları. Keza ilk devlet olan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti federal bir devletti. Üç yıl dayandı. As­lında 1963’te biten iki toplumlu, iki kesimli, siyasi eşitliğe dayalı ve iki kuruculu federal bir çözüm 1968’den beri bir BM stratejisi olarak karşımıza çıktı. Sıfır ile çar­pımdan başka bir sonuç vermedi.

O gün de Rumlarla hiçbir ortak noktamız yoktu bugün de yok. Ke­za yukarıdaki Rum girişimleri­nin amacına bakıldığında 1960’ın benzeri bir şekilde Rum tarafı­nın iktidarı paylaşmak istemedi­ği aşikâr. Burada haksızda değiller çünkü AB üyeliğiyle Kıbrıs’ın tek temsilcisi ve tek sahibi ilan edil­diler. Masada ellerini güçlü görü­yorlar. Taviz kelimesini sözlükten çıkarmış durumdalar.

Ortaçağ’dan gelen bir Yunan başlığı olduğunu bilsek de biz yi­ne de fes takmalarını! İstemiyo­ruz. ‘İki devletli’ bir adadan ya­nayız. 1983’ten beri Ada’nın ku­zeyinde işleyen bir devlet var. Bu devlet ambargo altında 38 yıldır ayakta. Bu devletin siyasi irade­si, siyasi sistemi, meclisi, karar verme yetisi var. Ama en önem­lisi kendisini KKTC’li kabul eden ve bu siyasi gerçekliği yaşayan ve yaşatan vatandaşları var.

Bugün Doğu Akdeniz’de den­gelerin istikrarı için iki devletli bir Kıbrıs çözümüne ve Kıbrıs’ta güçlendirilmiş Türk varlığına ih­tiyaç var. Bu noktada BM tarafın­dan federal bir Kıbrıs için yapıla­cak görüşmelerin anlamı olma­dığını halklarımıza net şekilde anlatırken iki devletli çözümün amaçlarını onların sahipleneceği şekilde ifade etmeliyiz.

Bu birlikteliği içeride sağlaya­maz isek dünyaya “ayrı devletler” olduğumuzu nasıl anlatacağız?

Adını Yunan mitolojisindeki “intikam tanrıçası” olan Nemesis’ten alan Nemesis Operasyonu, Taşnak Partisi tarafından Osmanlı siyasi – askeri liderinin ve Azerbaycan Türkleri’nin katledilmesi amacıyla 1920 – 1922 yıllarında gerçekleştirilen gizli bir operasyondur. Liderlerinin Şahan Natali ve Karekin Pastırmacıyan olduğu operasyonun en fazla ses getiren suikastlarının başında 1921 yılında Talat Paşa’nın Berlin’de şehit edilmesi gelmektedir.

Nemesis yani İntikam Operasyonu’nun Tarihsel Arka Planı

Türk (Osmanlı) yönetimi, 1. Dünya Savaşı sırasında dört bir koldan vatan savunması yaparken Ruslar da Anadolu’ya saldırmıştır. Taşnak Ermenileri ise Ruslara yardım ederek yol göstermiş, Türk askerlerini taciz etmiş, ulaşım ve ikmâl yollarını kesmiş ayrıca Türk köylerinde katliamlar gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu eylemlerinin sonucunda dönemin Türk Hükümeti İttihat-Terakkî, 24 Nisan 1915’te Taşnak Ermenilerini devlete karşı daha fazla yıkıcı faaliyette bulunmamaları amacıyla sevk ve iskan kanununa tabii tutarak bölgeden uzaklaştırmıştır. Türk devleti hiçbir şekilde ve hiçbir koşulda bir Ermeni soykırımı yapmamış bilakis daha fazla kan dökülmesini engellemek ve katliamları önlemek için politik bir karar almıştır.

Zaten Türklere karşı büyük bir kin ve nefret besleyen Ermeniler için Türk hükümetinin “sevk ve iskan” politikası bir bahane olmuştur. Yüzyıldır Ermeniler arasında “soykırım” olarak adlandırılan bu olay dünyaya bu şekilde tanıtılmaya çalışılmaktadır.

1920’lere gelindiğinde ise Anadolu’da Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa tarafından başlatılan Türk Millî Mücadelesinin parçalarından biri olan ve Kâzım Karabekir Paşa yönetiminde gerçekleştirilen ve Doğu Harekâtı sonucunda Anadolu’nun Doğusu Ermeni işgalinden kurtulmuş ve Taşnakların Anadolu’da bir Ermeni devleti kurma hayalleri suya düşmüştür. Bir tarafta Türkler Millî Mücadele savaşı verirken diğer taraftan ise Taşnaklar, Anadolu’da Müslüman Türk ve Kürtlere karşı vahşet içeren katliamlar uygulamış, baskınlar yapmış ve hatta soykırıma girişmişlerdir. Tüm bu olaylar gerçekleşirken dahi Ermeniler, uluslararası kamuoyuna 1915 olaylarını, katliam olarak tanıtmaya da devam etmiştir. 

            İntikam hırslarından gözü kör olan radikal Ermeni gruplar, bu noktada, sorumlu tuttukları Osmanlı Paşalarını hedef göstererek Nemesis Operasyonu’nu başlatmışlardır. Aralarında Gazi Paşa’nın da olduğu bilinen suikast listesini yayınlamışlar ve İttihatçı avını başlatmışlardır. Bu kapsamda Talat Paşa, Said Halim Paşa, Bahaddin Şakir Bey ile Cemal Azmi Bey ve Cemal Paşa, sırasıyla Ermeniler tarafından şehit edilmiştir. Ermeniler meseleyi yani intikamı kendi aralarında bir “millî dava” şeklinde görerek hareket etmişlerdir.

Manuk Manukyan adlı Daşnak-Nemesis militanı, Ankara’ya operasyona geldiği sırada yakalanarak idam edilmiştir. Mercan Altunyan adlı diğer bir Nemesis teröristinin liderlik ettiği “infaz timi” de 1927’de İstanbul’da çıkan bir çatışma sonucu imha edilmiştir.

Nemesis Operasyonu’nun Bugüne Etkisi

Ermenilerin bu anlamsız kini maalesef ki günümüzde de devam etmektedir. Gerek Erivan Hükümeti gerekse Ermeni Diasporası sözde Ermeni soykırımı iddialarını dünyaya tanıtmaya devam etmekte ve bunu, Türklere çeşitli platformlarda baskı aracı olarak kullanmaktalardır. İntikam hissini diri tutan Ermeniler, Talat Paşa’nın şehit edildiği 15 Mart gününü dahi, “haklı intikamlarının alındığı sevinç ve zafer günü” olarak kutlamaktadırlar; 2000’li yıllara kadar da ASALA olarak Nemesis Terör örgütü kendini devam ettirmiştir. Tüm bunlara ek olarak Ermenilerin Türkiye’den toprak talepleri ve Karabağ meselesi de Türk(iye) ve Ermeni(stan) ilişkilerini olumsuz etkilemeye devam etmektedir.

Sürekli Türkleri tahrik etmeye devam eden Ermeniler, Ermenistan’ın Şirak vilayetinde,Talat Paşa’yı katleden Soğoman Teyliryan’ın heykeli dikmişlerdi. Heykelin ayağının altında Talat Paşa’nın kesik başı tasvir edilmişti. Ermeniler Talat Paşa ve Türklere hakaret ederek işledikleri uluslararası insanlık suçunu bir de tescillendirmektedirler.

25 Mart 2023 tarihinde Türk takımının 2-1 skorla kazandığı Ermenistan ve Türkiye milli takımları arasında Erivan’da oynanan 2024 Avrupa Futbol Şampiyonası ön eleme maçında Ermeni taraftarları İstiklal Marşı’nı yuhalarken, birkaç milliyetçi pankart kaldırmışlardır. Bunların arasında özellikle NEMESİS sloganı göze batmaktadır.

En son 27 Nisan 2023 tarihinde Erivan’da Nemesis Anıtı, bir törenle açılmıştır. Bu duruma Türk tarafından hemen tepki gelmiştir. Dışişleri Bakanlığı’ndan yapılan yazılı açıklamada şunlar yazmaktadır:

“1920’li yılların başlarında Osmanlı siyasi ve askeri liderlerinin yanı sıra dönemin Azerbaycanlı yetkililerine ve hatta bazı Ermeni asıllı Osmanlı vatandaşlarına karşı gerçekleştirilen suikastların faillerine ithaf edilen ‘Nemesis Anıtı’nın Erivan’da açılmasını şiddetle kınıyoruz. Bu utanç verici anıtın açılması, 31 diplomatımız ve aile üyelerinin katledildiği menfur terör saldırılarına yol açan kanlı bir tedhiş hareketinin yüceltilmesidir. Bu olayın Ermeni basınında takdim ediliş tarzı da, tasvip edilmesi mümkün olmayan çarpık bir tarih yorumunun bazı zihinlerde halen devam ettiğini göstermektedir. Türkiye ve Ermenistan arasındaki normalleşme sürecinin ruhuyla bağdaşmayan bu tür provokatif adımlar, bölgede kalıcı ve sürdürülebilir barış ve istikrarın tesisine yönelik çabalara hiçbir suretle katkı sağlamayacak, tam tersine normalleşme sürecini olumsuz etkileyecektir”

Böylelikle ortaya çıkmaktadır ki Ermeni tarafı Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerin normalleşmesi gibi bir niyet taşımamakta ya da en azından bu normalleşme sürecine hazır bulunmamaktadır. Ermeniler, asla akıllanmamış, terör eğilimli bir millet olma özelliklerinden vazgeçmemişlerdir.

Söylemin temelini üçüncü güç olma isteği oluştururken, dikkatlerden kaçmayan tamlama ise bu gücün Fransa’nın liderliğinde olacağıydı. Macron bu talebini gündeme taşırken, Fransa ve Avrupa’nın Çin-ABD geriliminde ABD’nin peşinden sürüklenmemesi, ABD’nin uydusu olmaması gerektiğini özellikle belirtti.

Macron’a destek AB Konseyi Başkanı Charles Michel’den geldi. Michel’e göre, Avrupa’nın ABD’den “stratejik özerklik” kazanması gerektiği yönündeki Macron’un görüşü Avrupalı liderler tarafından giderek daha fazla dillendiriliyor. Michel, Ukrayna krizine ortak yaklaşımın AB’nin ABD’yi “körü körüne, sistematik olarak takip edeceği” anlamına gelmediğini söylüyor.

Bu tanımlama, Soğuk Savaş’ın bitişinin hemen sonrası sıklıkla yapılırdı. Soğuk Savaş’ın bitişi yalnızca komünist bloğun dağılmasıyla sonuçlanmadı, Batı bloğunda da kırılma yarattı. Sovyet tehdidinin bertaraf edilmesi Avrupa’nın güvenlik anlayışının yumuşamasına, NATO’ya ve tabii ki ABD’ye olan bağımlılığın sorgulanmasına neden oldu.

Bu dönemde bir Avrupa ordusunun kurulması fikri sıklıkla gündeme taşındı. Bu fikir, Almanya ve Fransa arasında ikili istişarelerde geliştirilen kısaca PESCO olarak adlandırılan “Kalıcı Yapılandırılmış İşbirliği Savunma Anlaşması” ile ancak 2017 yılında sonuçlandırılabildi. Anlaşma kapsamında bir AB ordusu oluşturulması öngörülmüyor.

Anlaşmaya imza atan her ülkeden, AB’nin ortak savunmasına nasıl katkı yapabileceği konusunda ulusal planlarını hazırlamaları isteniyor. Yani ucu belirsiz bir yapı. Bir de AB’nin Doğu Avrupalı üyelerinin endişeleri var.

Yıllarca “komünist blok” içerisinde bağımsız politikalardan uzak kalan ve güvenlik endişesi karşı bloktan çok kendi blok liderinden kaynaklanan bu ülkeler, Macron’un çıkışına destek verecek gibi görünmüyorlar. Keza, AB’nin Doğu Avrupalı üyeleri Rusya’nın Ukrayna işgaliyle ekonomik önceliklerini güvenlik önceliklerinin arkasına koymak zorunda kaldılar. Bu ülkelere “NATO mu, AB mi?” diye sorulsa, bu ortamda “NATO” cevabı kesin gibi gözüküyor.

Nitekim, Polonya Başbakanı Mateusz Morawiecki, “ABD ile ittifak, Avrupa güvenliğinin mutlak temelidir” açıklamasını yaptı. Bu yaklaşımlar, bir AB ordusu yaratılamadan ya da AB ülkelerine güvence verecek bir Avrupalı güç çıkmadıkça değişmeyecektir ki, NATO’ya alternatif bir “Avrupa Ordusu” kurulması ya da “Avrupa’ya özgü bir güvenlik mimarisi” yaratılması zor.

Fransa’nın böylesi bir gücü var mı? Bunun cevabını ABD’li Cumhuriyetçi Senatör Marco Rubio vermiş. “Macron küresel süper güç olma rolüne büründüğünde ve teröristlerle savaşmak için Kuzey Afrika’ya asker göndermek istediğinde bölgeye birliklerini biz götürüp getirdik.

Avrupa, eğer Macron’un örneğindeki gibi bir başına kalmayı tercih edecekse, bu durumda kazançlı çıkacak olan biziz.” Diğer taraftan, Avrupa’daki Atlantikçiler ile ulusüstü yapıya şüpheci yaklaşanlar da Macron’un fikrine olumlu bakmayacaklardır. NATO bünyesinde oluşturulan güvenlik iş birliği egemenlik devrini gerektirmezken AB çatısı altında güvenlik iş birliği tersi bir durum yaratıyor.

Tüm bunların yanında Avrupa’nın diğer devi Almanya’nın AB özelinde ulus üstü yapının liderliğini Fransa’ya bırakmayı kabul edebilmesi mümkün değil. Tüm bu girdiler sonrası Macron’un üçüncü güç açıklaması, Fransa için bir siyasi ve askeri yol haritası oluşturabilir. Bu haritanın başarısı yalnızca Fransa’nın izlediği politikalarla değil bu politikanın tüm AB ülkelerinde bir karşılık bulmasıyla olabilecektir.

Sefcovic’e göre platforma toplam 107 şirket kaydoldu ve bunların 77’si, 11,6 milyar metreküp gaz almayı bekledikleri ilk ihaleye resmen girdi. İlk tur ihale 15 Mayıs’a kadar devam edecek. Bu günlerde, Batılı yetkililerin beklediği gibi, dış güvenilir tedarikçiler (Shefcovic’in tanımladığı gibi tabii ki Rusya dahil değil), sabırsızlıkla ve sürekli düşen fiyatlarla, Avrupalılara en az 9,6 milyar metreküp boru hattı ve en az 2,8 milyar sıvılaştırılmış doğal gaz sunacak. 

Ancak Avrupa’da bu haberin neşesini gelen ikinci bir mesaj tamamen bozdu.  AB ülkelerinden şirketler kaynak tedarikçilerinden haber beklerken, Macaristan ve Sırbistan aynı zamanda, iki ülkenin de yararına gaz satın alacak bir ortak girişimi duyurdular. 

Bu, Dışişleri Bakanı Peter Szijjarto tarafından, kurulmakta olan derneğin devlete ait şirketler olan MVM ve Sırbistangaz’ı içereceğinin altını çizerek açıklandı. Macaristan temsilcisi, ülkesinin enerji işbirliği çerçevesinde Sırbistan’ın çıkarlarını sağlamak için “yüz milyonlarca metreküp gazı” kendi depolama tesislerinde depolamayı taahhüt ettiğini de sözlerine ekledi. Kesin rakam açıklanmadı. Ancak daha önce özel yayınlarda 500 milyon metreküp olduğu söylenmişti. Elbette ki bu rakam, AB için gerekli olan milyarlarca metreküpü karşılayamaz. Ancak Macarlar ve Sırpların toplam ihtiyacının beşte biri kadarını karşılayacak bir rezerv olduğu ispatlanmıştır.

Her iki olay da Avrupa’nın perde arkasında devam eden ve Moskova’ya sevinmesi için nedenler vermemek için genellikle konuşulmayan iç siyasi çekişmelerin yoğunluğunu yansıtıyor. Diğer taraftan Avrupa Birliği içinde bir çıkar birliği çatışması yaşanmaktadır. Ama ilk durumdaki gibi özel şirketler havuç – sopa yöntemiyle tek bir ticaret platformuna yönlendirilirse, kendi çıkarlarına bağlılık ve tamamen gönüllü olarak birlikte çalışmaya karar veren Budapeşte ve Belgrad geri adım atabilir. Fakat her şeye rağmen gözükmektedir ki Rus gazı, Avrupa’nın bir bütün olarak yaşamı üzerinde makul miktarda baskı uygulamaya devam etmektedir.

Bir Rus düşünce kuruluşu olan RİA, durumu şu sözlerle açıklamıştır:

“Brüksel ve uyduları elbette gazsız kalamaz. Ancak es geçilen Rus rotası dikkate alındığında, Norveç, pratik olarak alternatifsiz kalmaktadır ki AB ve İngiltere’ye 122 milyar metreküp doğal gaz ile rekoru kırmıştır. Diğer bir seçenek ise Azerbaycan’dan gaz teminidir. Ancak bu rota, oldukça koşulluluk içermektedir. Zira Bakü’nün imkanları kısıtlıdır.”

Gerçekten de Bakü’nün üç ana boru hattından oluşan güney gaz koridoru mevcuttur: Trans-Anadolu, Güney Kafkasya ve Trans-Adriyatik. TANAP doğal gaz boru hattı için ise en önemli aktör Türkiye’dir. Bu konuyla ilgili RİA şu açıklamada bulunmuştur: “Bu konuda, Ankara’nın siyasi hırsları ve 14 Mayıs’ta yaşanacak seçimde olası iktidar değişikliği gibi faktörler devreye girmektedir. Yeniden Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın seçilmesi durumunda unutulmamalıdır ki Türkiye’nin Avrupa ile uzun süredir hançerli bir tangosu var.”

Kısaca belirtmek gerekir ki Rusya’yı sıkıştıran Avrupa, bağımlılıktan kurtulmadı. Üstelik şimdi, tek bir kilit kaynak tedarikçisi yerine, aynı anda birkaç tanesi sorunlu olan kaynak tedarikçileri oluştu. Kuzeyde ağırlığını artıran Norveç ve güneyde büyük bir güç olarak sahneye çıkan Türkiye (Azerbaycan’dan dolayı), bu hususta neredeyse rekabetsiz duruma evrilmiş durumda. Zira Orta Doğu, ek tedarik anlaşmaları yaparak ve yuan bölgesine doğru ilerliyor.

Özetle Avrupa bu yıl donmayacak, ancak güvenilir tedarikçiler bulmakta zorluk yaşarsa bundan sonraki kışlar, çok sıcak geçmeyecek.

Geleneksel dönemde istihbarat faaliyetleri genellikle hasım olunan devletin saldırı ve savunma planlarının ele geçirilmesi maksatlıdır.[2] Bu dönem ayrıca geleneksel savaşların yaşandığı dönemle paralellik göstermektedir. Ticari ilişkilerin de artması ve ulus devlet anlayışının ortaya çıkmasıyla diplomatik ilişkiler kurulmuş ve böylece diplomat casuslarında bulundukları ülkeler hakkında istihbarat toplamaya başladığı görülmektedir.[3] Özellikle diplomatik misyonlardaki elçilerin, çevirmenlerin ve diplomatik kuryelerin bu dönemde seyahat ettikleri bölgelerden stratejik istihbarat topladığı ve monarklar arasında gizli yazışmalara hizmet ettiği de bilinmektedir.[4] Öte yandan 14.YY’ın erken dönemlerinde Roma ve İspanyol monarşileri kendi otoritelerini koruma altında tutmak maksadıyla gizli polis teşkilatlarını bu dönemde kurmuştur.[5] İngiltere Kraliçesi I. Elizabeth ise istihbarat servisine akademisyenler, mühendisler ve dil bilimciler gibi bir çok farklı alandan profesyonelleri işe alarak, onları istihbarat servislerinin yöntemleri ve üretilen analizlerin geliştirilmesi maksadıyla kullanmıştır. Özellikle Rönesans döneminde gelişen teknolojinin istihbarat toplama vasıtalarına da katkısı olmuştur. Bu minvalde geliştirilmiş olan görünmez mürekkep ve matematik alanındaki gelişmeler kriptoloji ve gizli yazışmanın gelişmesini sağlamıştır. Yine bu dönemde teleskopun ve büyüteçlerin icadı ile gözetleme faaliyetleri kolaylaşmış, ajanlar ise dead drop kullanmaya başlamıştır.[6]

Sanayi Devrimi ve Fransız İhtilalini de kapsayan geçiş dönemi teknolojinin savaşlara en çok nüfuz ettiği ve etkisini arttırdığı dönemdir. Dönemin siyasi koşulları ve teknolojik gelişmeler istihbaratın da değişime ve gelişime önemli etkilerde bulunmuştur. Bu dönemde istihbarat açısından dönüşüme en çok etki eden teknolojik gelişmeler telgrafın icadı ve mors alfabesinin bulunmasıdır. Bu sayede devletler kolonilerindeki casuslarıyla haberleşme imkanı sağlamış ve diğer ülkelerin iç politikalarını daha yakından gözlemler hala gelmiştir.[7] Benzer şekilde ticari gelişmeler ve kolonileşme yarışı gibi etkenler, istihbaratın öncelikli görev kapsamının yalnızca devlet ve otorite güvenliğinin sağlanması değil, ekonomik çıkarlara dair bilgilerin de elde edilmesi yönünde evirilmesine sebep olmuştur. [8]

Modern dönem olarak yorumladığımız 20. ve 21. yüzyıllar istihbarat teknolojileri için altın çağ olarak kabul edilebilir. I. Dünya Savaşı sırasında telgraflarla ve radyo sinyalleriyle yapılan iletişimin kesme atılarak dinlenebilmesi istihbarata verilen değeri ve önemin artmasına neden olmuştur.[9] İstihbarata verilen önemin artmasını sağlayan bir diğer gelişme ise uydu ve uçaklar sayesinde jeo-mekansal ve sinyal istihbaratlarının toplanmaya başlamasıdır.[10] 1903 yılında Wright Kardeşlerin geliştirdiği uçağın kameralarla donatılması sonucunda I. Dünya Savaşı’nın kilit istihbarat kanyağı haline gelen havadan gözetlemek keşif vasıtaları olmuştur. Böylece düşman tahkimatları, askeri dağılımları ve savaş alanları fotoğraflanarak komutanlara harekat planı oluşturmada en önemli istihbarat kaynağı olmuştur.[11]

21. yüzyılda istihbarat vasıtaları son 100 yılda gelişen teknolojinin de yardımıyla yeni enstrümanlar edinmeye başlamış ve mekanik bir yapı kazanmıştır. Bilgisayar teknolojilerinin icadı ile 21. yüzyıl istihbaratı arasındaki yakından bağlantı II. Dünya Savaşı sırasındaki Alman gizli haberleşmesinin çözümüne dayanmaktadır. Şöyle ki, Bletchley Park (GCHQ) tarafından geliştirilen iki İngiliz yapımı makine (Elektro-mekanik Bombe ve Colossus) Alman kriptolarını çözmede kullanılmıştır. Bu makineler ilk elektronik, dijital ve programlanabilir bilgisayarlardır.[12] Bu mekanikleşme sayesinde artık istihbarat hedeften kilometrelerce uzaktan bile toplanabilir hale gelmiştir.[13]

İstihbaratın vasıta ve fonksiyonlarında böylesine büyük gelişmeler yaşanırken, toplama kapasitesi, doğruluk değeri ve zamanında ulaştırılabilirliği de artmıştır. Fakat istihbaratın öneminin artmasındaki tek önemli etken teknolojik gelişmeler ile yaşanan vasıta ve fonksiyonlardaki genişlemeler ile açıklanamaz. Teknolojik gelişmelerin yanı sıra, jeopolitik karmaşalar, bilgi tekonolojilerindeki evrimler, değişen sosyopolitik yapı gibi diğer etkenlerin sebep olduğu gelişmeler de istihbarata verilen önemin değişmesine ve doğasının şekillenmesinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Özellikle bilgi teknolojileri özelindeki evrimler hem sosyopolitik hemde jeopolitik yapılarda değişime sebep olmasıyla çok daha önemli bir etkiye sahiptir.

Rus-Çerkes Savaşı sırasında, Rus İmparatorluğu Çerkes sivilleri katletmek için soykırımsal bir strateji uygulamıştır. Ruslaşmayı ve Rus İmparatorluğu içinde yeniden yerleşimi kabul eden yalnızca küçük bir kısım Çerkes, din değiştirme şartıyla soykırımdan kurtulmuştur. Bu şartları reddeden Çerkeslerin büyük bir kesimi ise  çeşitli şekillerde dağıtılmış veya toplu halde öldürülmüştür. Rus askerleri tarafından Çerkes köylerinin yeri tespit edilmiş ve tespit edilen köyler yakılmıştır. Köylüler sistematik olarak aç bırakılmış veya tüm nüfusları katledilmiştir.

Olaylara tanık olan İngiliz diplomat William Palgrave, “tek suçlarının Rus olmamak olduğunu” yazmıştır. İngilizlerin ilgisi karşısında Çerkes liderler, İngiliz İmparatorluğundan insani yardım talep etmiştir. Ancak aynı dönemde bu liderler başta olmak üzere toplu bir tehcir başlatılmıştır. 1864’te başlayan savaş, 1867’ye kadar devam etmiş, bunca acıya bir de salgın hastalıklar ve açlıktan ölümler de eklenmiştir. Çerkes nüfusunun %80 ila 90 arasında bir bölümünün yok olduğu ya da kayıp olduğu bilinmektedir.

Kalan Çerkeslerin çoğunun, varış noktası ise Osmanlı Devleti olmuştur. Kaynaklar, toplamda 1 ila 1,5 milyon Çerkes’in kaçmak zorunda kaldığını, ancak yalnızca yarısının Osmanlı Devleti’ne varabildiğini belirtmektedir. Osmanlı devlet arşivleri de 1879’da Kafkasya’dan topraklarına giren yaklaşık 1 milyon göçmenin varlığına işaret etmektedir. Osmanlı arşivleri aynı zamanda Çerkes soykırımını 19. yüzyılın en büyük soykırımı olarak kaydetmiştir.